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Abstract
The article calls into question the prevailing discursive construction in contemporary debate on privacy and surveillance.
At the core of this discourse is a moral coupling wherein surveillance is perceived as enemy and privacy as friend. Even if
this binary approach renders arguments for democratising data more persuasive, a political cost accompanies it. As this
discourse situates political struggle at the level of digital infrastructure and political structures, the moral coupling largely
overlooks the ambiguities of how people in their various activities in a digital environment experience surveillance and
privacy. Such a framing may discourage users at large from engagement with politics of privacy. Edward Snowden’s auto-
biography is taken as a prominent example of the prevailing discourse. While analysing Snowden’s descriptions of privacy
and surveillance critically, the author points out the specific value of life stories in describing what privacy means and why
it matters. While we cannot assume all people to be equally capable of considering how their own life intersects with
the history of their society, we can presume that varying life stories should contribute to the public knowledge of privacy.
To provide the framework necessary for appropriately contextualising empirical evidence, the author presents a model
wherein privacy is composed of five dimensions: solitude, anonymity, secrecy, intimacy, and dignity.
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1. Introduction
In the last 15 years, the media environment has wit-
nessed dramatic upheaval. The core of this change has
been characterised as the Internet’s metamorphosis
from a loosely organised, decentralised, and pluralistic
system into a tightly controlled, centralised, and com-
modified one under corporate and government control
(Mosco, 2018, p. 210). While library shelves groan un-
der the weight of books about what digital technology
is doing to us and our world, many of the media’s words
about cloud computing, big data-based analysis, and the
Internet of Things have been promotional or technically
oriented (see Morozov, 2013). Simultaneously, burgeon-
ing critical literature on surveillance is prompting discus-
sion of what Mosco (2018, p. 213) terms “the serious
policy issues that arise in a world of massive data cen-
tres, nonstop analysis of human behaviour and ubiqui-
tous connectivity.”
One of the key topics in critical debate over ‘the
next Internet’ is digital surveillance and its reported ef-
fects on people’s privacy. While this discussion features
a host of perspectives, rooted in fields from social and
legal theory to sociology or science and technology stud-
ies, I would argue that great centripetal force in media
and political debate gets imposed via moral coupling of
surveillance and privacy. The associated discourse tends
to take a liberal, rights-oriented approach to privacy and
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proceed to ask institutions of surveillance “what hidden
misuses, what unintended evils…you perpetuate behind
your promises of safety” (Hong, 2017, p. 190). At least im-
plicitly, this moral coupling presents surveillance as ‘bad’
or ‘evil’ while privacy gets portrayed as a desirable qual-
ity (Fuchs, 2011, p. 221), or as ‘friend.’
There is much to be said in favour of this moral-
coupling discourse. It is instrumental in creating
hermeneutics of suspicion around surveillance, thereby
supporting political struggle to democratise data power
and address worries about possible detrimental effects
of digital surveillance on the public (Kennedy & Moss,
2015). In consequence, now “the future of state surveil-
lance [appears] a little less certain, a little more open for
negotiation” (Hong, 2017, p. 188). In the process, how-
ever, the discourse compromises conceptual depth. Said
critique is not easily reconciled with the acknowledged
benefits of surveillance in producing valuable knowledge
about the population (Foucault, 2004), or in mitigating
the ontological insecurity of modernity (Bauman & Lyon,
2013, p. 102). In the absence of theoretical reflexivity,
this discourse skims over nuance and sometimes appears
too dogmatic.
Simultaneously, with its dependence on a rights-
based approach to privacy, the moral-coupling-based
discourse is rather unresponsive to theories wherein
privacy is relational and contextual (see boyd, 2014;
Nissenbaum, 2004). Hence, the dominant discourse fails
to engage with specifics of what people do in and with
their privacy and how their lives may (or may not) be
harmed by surveillance.
A further deficiency with this coupling lies in the
political realm. As legal theorist Daniel Solove (2011,
p. 2) notes, security interests—often cited in appeals for
surveillance—are readily understood, for life and limb are
at stake, while privacy rights remain abstract and vague.
In such settings, the concepts are positioned in a hierar-
chy rather than balance, and the political efficacy of the
respective arguments follows the same lines. While state
surveillance institutions may be more readily subject to
criticism amid the fallout from Edward Snowden’s revela-
tions, any effect on intelligence legislation has been quite
limited (on the UK’s situation, see Hintz & Dencik, 2017;
on France, see Baisnée & Nicholas, 2017).
In addition, the moral-coupling discourse situates
political struggle at structural level, highlighting roles
of technological infrastructure elements and the big
players managing these: principally, the most power-
ful state actors (the US, China, and Russia) and (mostly
US-based) Internet behemoths such as Google, Amazon,
and Facebook. In so doing, it largely overlooks the am-
biguities of how people in their varied activities in dig-
ital environments experience surveillance and privacy.
This framing has implications for public understanding of
what is at stake in ‘the politics of privacy’ and may actu-
ally discourage users at large from political engagement.
Hence, it seems that the moral-coupling discourse,
while representing necessary criticism of surveillance, is
inadequate. Hong suggests that, for an escape from this
predicament, a more robust form of surveillance criti-
cism should reveal privacy to be a fragile and conflict-
laden concept (Hong, 2017, p. 192). As tempting as that
may sound, I set off in the opposite direction for my rec-
ommendation in this article. Given that a vast array of
digital surveillance may be reshaping our lives, we must
direct more theoretical and empirical effort, not less, to
understanding people’s life-worlds.
The resulting empirical evidenceof people’s thoughts
on these matters or even of underlying reality would be
meaningless without an accompanying pertinent theo-
retical perspective and research design to inform enquiry
(Crotty, 1998, pp. 2–3). Accordingly, this article discusses
both aspects: the concept of privacy itself and method-
ology. The theory-oriented aim for the article is, hence,
a two-pronged one, which I pursue not by mapping out
all relevant theories of privacy but by outlining a coher-
ent typology of privacy that lends itself to empirical en-
deavours. While the main focus here is on the typology,
I discuss the life story’s value for privacy studies alongside
this. To that end, Snowden’s autobiography Permanent
Record (2019) serves two functions. On the one hand, it
exemplifies the moral-coupling discourse; on the other
hand, it also provides hints of how to progress beyond it.
2. Surveillance as Enemy
In its contemporary context, the moral-coupling dis-
course refers most prominently to the US, with the most
well-known recent disclosure of mass surveillance pro-
grammes pointing a finger at the US National Security
Agency. Also, as the scale and scope of surveillance of
users online has been revealed, it is large US-based
companies that have come under the strongest public
scrutiny. For the most part, the ensuing political debate
on the subject has been structured by liberal political
thought. Though the debate’s US political context is in
many ways unique, the attendant moral-coupling dis-
course has found its way to European politics and media.
Snowden is a prominent figure in surveillance-related
debates. In his autobiography, he vividly describes his
path to learning of the secret mass-surveillance pro-
grammes developed and conducted by US intelligence
agencies and to gradually growing convinced that those
activities had to be revealed to the public, whatever
the ensuing damage to his personal life. While the book
shows that Snowden’s role in this exposure relied on ex-
ceptional technological skills, developed from early in
life, the book is aimed, more than anything else, at jus-
tifying his central political conclusion: Surveillance in the
hands of intelligence agencies had deviated from course
and must be subject to proper democratic oversight.
Ever since his revelations pertaining to the NSA and
other agencies, Snowdenhas been an important and con-
troversial figure in international politics. Therefore, his
autobiography is not just any life story. While the book
was carefully designed to be a best seller for large global
Media and Communication, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 248–257 249
audiences, its format enables not only Snowden but also
readers to “view the intersection of the life history of
men with the history of their society, thereby enabling
us to understand better the choices, contingencies and
options open to the individual” (Robert Bogdan, as cited
in Plummer, 2001).
Snowden (2019, p. 228) presents an occasion, less
than a year prior to Snowden’s revelations, that consti-
tuted a moment of epiphany of the sort cited as typical
of autobiographies (Denzin, 1989):
I picked up [theUSConstitution] in earnest. I hadn’t re-
ally read the whole thing in quite a few years, though
I was glad to note that I still knew the preamble by
heart. Now, however, I read through it in its entirety,
from the Articles to the Amendments. I was surprised
to be reminded that fully 50 percent of the Bill of
Rights, the document’s first ten amendments, were in-
tended to make the job of law enforcement harder.
His view on that foundational law reveal Snowden’s
civil libertarian leanings, which tie in with the traditions
of American political thought. This background aids in
recognising that Snowden does not find surveillance bad
by default. The problem resides, rather, in surveillance
powers having overstepped the checks and balances of
democratic governance. Besides the absence of effective
systematic oversight, Snowden notes that intelligence ac-
tivities are no longer truly in the state’s hands: Much of
the technological expertise is outsourced to private com-
panies and individual system specialists more interested
in sizeable pay packets than in the security of the nation.
He concludes that, in consequence, digital surveillance
has become dangerous, especially when under state aus-
pices, and that there is urgent need for an appropriate
political design placing those powers back in check.
In academic literature, the notion of surveillance as
enemy is promulgated in empirical and theoretical con-
texts alike. Empirical studies have been undertaken to
shed light on the actual mechanics and ultimate goals
related to various surveillance agencies’ data-gathering
endeavours, profiling, and efforts to follow their tar-
gets across as many geographical locations and devices
as possible (Morozov, 2013; Turow, 2011). For instance,
ethnographic studies conducted in the US (Eubanks,
2018; Madden, Gillman, Levy, & Marwick, 2017) and the
UK (Redden, Dencik, & Warne, 2020) attest to how al-
gorithmic surveillance is growing into an indispensable
tool for the public sector, most notably in social work
and policing.
The main conclusion from the empirical studies is
that surveillance in the digital environment is expansive,
if not excessive. Critical theorists tend to go even further
by claiming that surveillance is, above all, a transforma-
tive force. In her discussion of ‘surveillance capitalism,’
Zuboff (2019, p. 93) argues that the economic market’s
prevailing logic has changed, declaring that “now serving
the genuine needs of people is less lucrative, and there-
fore less important, than selling predictions of their be-
havior.” Couldry and Mejias (2018), in turn, posit that
datafication enables appropriation of all life as rawmate-
rial for economic exploitation in precisely the ways colo-
nialism enabled appropriating land, resources, and bod-
ies for European rulers’ benefit in the eighteenth and
nineteenth century.
Whether presented against the backdrop of the
Constitution, capitalism-related critical theory, or cri-
tique of colonialism, surveillance poses threats to demo-
cratic governance. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to as-
sume that surveillance is at least potentially ‘bad’ or ‘evil,’
thereby warranting politicisation as ‘enemy.’ A question
remains, though, as to whether this picture is compre-
hensive enough. Does knowing the enemymean that we
also know the friend?
3. ‘Privacy’ as an Empty Word
With themoral-coupling discourse, surveillance theorists
tend to discuss privacy in a narrow sense of the con-
cept. For instance, Zuboff (2019, p. 90) argues that pri-
vacy has been not eroded but, as a decisional right, redis-
tributed as surveillance capital; that is, decisions about
what to reveal or keep secret are no longer made by indi-
vidual users, as companies have gained those rights and
exercise them by appealing to dubious terms of service.
With this stance, her research, while focused on surveil-
lance, covers privacy too. After all, the former has sub-
sumed the latter. Where Zuboff addresses decisional pri-
vacy only insofar as it refers to content and data gen-
erated by users on digital platforms, others extend the
consideration of decisional privacy to matters of lifestyle
and the life projects one pursues, as with issues of which
church to attend or what education to pursue (Rössler,
2005, p. 79).
Within the moral coupling discourse, limited interest
in the concept of privacy is not troubling, as the expan-
sion of surveillance is wrong in its own right, violating
such key values of liberal democracy as transparency. For
example, in book The Black Box Society, Pasquale (2015)
argues that people do not comprehend the extent of the
information collected through close monitoring by gov-
ernmental and other institutions, let alone how it is used
or the consequences of that collection. The problem is
not that people lose their privacy but that their right to
know is not respected.
While itmaybe surprising, then, that Snowdenwrites
at length about privacy, there is a stark contrast against
his explicit indictment of state surveillance. His defence
of privacy remains abstract and elusive. The autobiogra-
phy makes this rather explicit (2019, p. 208): “The word
‘privacy’ itself is somewhat empty, because it is essen-
tially indefinable, or over-definable. Each of us has our
own idea of what it is. ‘Privacy’ means something to ev-
eryone. There is no one to whom it means nothing.”
Snowden draws from a negative definition of privacy,
one referring to absence of intervention and thus leaving
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the space relatively empty. That said, ripples from that
space are far from absent, for privacy as a right consti-
tutes a foundation to all liberties. Even if Snowden talks
about subjects granted privacy in the plural (‘Americans’),
the emphasis is on the individual and an ideal figure of
the autonomous liberal subject:
Americans only have a ‘right’ to free speech because
the government is forbidden from making any law re-
stricting that freedom, and a ‘right’ to a free press be-
cause the government is forbidden from making any
law to abridge it. They only have a ‘right’ to worship
freely because the government is forbidden frommak-
ing any law respecting an establishment of religion,
and a ‘right’ to peaceably assemble and protest be-
cause the government is forbidden from making any
law that says they can’t. (Snowden, 2019, p. 207)
By claiming that privacy is indefinable and over-definable
at the same time, Snowden points to what limits em-
pirically understanding privacy. He suggests, on the one
hand, that privacy is so abstract that a proper definition
of the concept is beyond his grasp; on the other hand,
he simultaneously anchors it in concrete subjective ex-
periences and individuals’ choices (either way, any fur-
ther analysis or theorising that might be possible lies out-
side his interest here). While the book refers to many
concrete moments in which experiences of privacy were
particularly meaningful for Snowden—among the posi-
tive ones are moments of intimacy experienced both of-
fline and online (2019, pp. 99–100), alongside opportuni-
ties for time alone while commuting (p. 108)—he other-
wise prefers to talk about privacy in generic rather than
personal terms. For instance, in relation to one’s auton-
omy and dignity, he states “you don’t have to be a closet
fetishist to have done things that embarrass you and
to fear that strangers might misunderstand you if those
things were exposed” (p. 95).
In Snowden’s life story,moral coupling of surveillance
with privacy contributes to a narrative of growth toward
politically consistent subjectivity. The story presents
strict adherence to two central tenets of liberal (if not
libertarian) democracy: a belief in privacy as the foun-
dation of all personal liberties and trust in the system
of checks and balances in preventing abuse of power.
This idealistic, textbook-type formulation is cast in sharp
relief against an atmosphere of pervasive surveillance
realism aimed at normalising surveillance infrastructure
(Dencik, 2018, p. 31). The contrast highlights Snowden’s
separation from the institutions to which he pledged loy-
alty once upon a time, and his choice of the former over
the latter articulates a difference from his erstwhile col-
leagues in the intelligence community, presumably more
compliant with surveillance realism.
While describing some of his own private moments
in the book, Snowden says little about lives of people
outside his closest circle. Hence, the reader is shown a
life-world that, apart from his brief stint in Japan and
associations with manga fans, is populated by white
Anglo-Saxon civil servants. More importantly, Snowden’s
portrayal does not overtly connect with lives of people
showing less interest in and knowledge of digital sys-
tems and surveillance. My point here is not to point a
finger at any lack of cultural diversity in Snowden’s ac-
count so much as highlight possible connections with
how surveillance and privacy get coupled in a narrative
from this perspective.
On our journey beyond such moral coupling dis-
course, we can ask what sorts of evidence and voices get
overlooked through it. With the discussion below, I issue
a challenge to broaden the perspective by overcoming
the moral-coupling discourse’s limited, outdated under-
standing of users in a digital environment. However nor-
matively commendable Snowden’s perspective may be,
it is tied to a specific understanding of the politics of pri-
vacy that is not merely specific but also exclusive.
4. Surveillance from Users’ Perspective
Critical debate on surveillance has a cumulative effect
on the moral coupling in that the more information
about the scope of surveillance is revealed, the more
likely it is for surveillance to be perceived as the en-
emy. Still, studies among users suggest that user atti-
tudes toward surveillance are often contradictory, even
paradoxical. Surveys frequently identify a gulf between
user-expressed attitudes and behaviour. Empirical find-
ings indicate that, while users are concerned about their
privacy on the Internet in general, and within the social
web in particular, usage behaviour does not reflect these
concerns correspondingly (CIGI–Ipsos, 2017). Two main
factors are cited as behind this privacy paradox: Users re-
portedly lack awareness of opportunities to protect their
privacy, and they tend to underestimate the privacy dan-
gers of self-disclosure (Taddicken, 2014, pp. 248–249).
The privacy paradox and its part in explaining users’
relationship to surveillance constitutes a controversial
topic in studies of science, technology, and society.
Criticisms aside (see boyd & Hargittai, 2010; Tufekci,
2008), the interpretation predominating in surveys is
that discrepancies between attitudes and informed ac-
tions reflect shortcomings in rationality among users,
suggesting that users are unwittingly compliant with
surveillance forces that may abuse them (Barth & de
Jong, 2017, pp. 1038–1040). This view is consistent with
themoral coupling: with people being only partially com-
mitted to the idea that surveillance is the enemy and
that privacy must be safeguarded, greater education of
the public in the hazards of surveillance and in means of
defending one’s privacy is required. In some cases, the
moral-coupling discourse adopts a false-consciousness
framework as a foundation for efforts to explain why sub-
jects accept surveillance in an act of ‘voluntary servitude’
(Robert Pallitto, as quoted in Hong, 2017, p. 189).
This reasoning is problematic, not least because it
operates with vague analytical categories such as ‘atti-
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tudes’ and ‘behaviour’ and draws broad generalisations
about them without accounting for the everyday con-
texts in which uses of social media and the Internet are
embedded. At least implicitly, research into the privacy
paradox seems to rely on assumptions dating from the
mass-communication-dominated era, when media con-
sumption was perceived as introspective; e.g., in his clas-
sic study of newspaper-reading, Berelson (1949, p. 199)
noted that readers value newspapers for respite func-
tions, as reading ‘provides a vacation from personal
care by transporting the reader outside his own imme-
diate world.’
Even if respite may be found in media on digital plat-
forms too, this environment tends to facilitate and con-
tribute to encounters involving interaction rather more
than introspection. The digital landscape affords activ-
ity that can be social while still technical. It enables en-
counters with “all friends, relatives, teachers, neighbors
and many unknown others” (Meyrowitz, 1985, p. 4) via
interaction involving much more: numerous functions
of computers, as hardware and software, local and re-
mote, respond to every keystroke andmouse movement
(Manovich, 2001, p. 155). An appropriate metaphor for
the digital landscape is traffic congestion. Users can-
not control everything and may recognise this, expect-
ing to be interrupted (or even disturbed) by other users
and ‘third parties’ such as advertisers and infrastruc-
tural elements.
Various forms of disturbance online can be readily
experienced as surveillance. When official surveillance
is associated with situations of social interaction, users
tend to deem the matter serious. Among more com-
monplace cases are incidents of stalking, webcam-based
blackmail, blackmail-related scams, and ‘sextortion,’ in
which the actors responsible are usually peer users,
not public institutions or commercial entities (Heikkilä,
2018, pp. 68–69). In more everyday activities, users
are reminded of surveillance through technical interac-
tion such as automated, algorithm-governed ‘communi-
cation’ that can be generated whenever users purchase
goods/services online, participate in customer-loyalty
programmes, use online search engines, click on adver-
tisements, upload content to social-media platforms, or
sign in to other services via a personal Google ID or
Facebook account (Kennedy, 2018).
In day-to-day life, awareness of practices in that last
class tends to fade into the background, getting reacti-
vated when clearly surveillance-based feedback reaches
the user. Many institutions responsible for surveillance,
such as intelligence agencies and the police, deliber-
ately avoid feedback loops, since informing/reminding
of surveillance would go against their interests. In the
meantime, commercial Internet service providers apply
surveillance feedback loops differently, as their business
model is predicated on the idea that all advertising must
be targeted (Turow, 2013). Therefore, nearly every piece
of empirical evidence of surveillance that users see is ad-
vertising. All the rest is left to the imagination.
While outputs in selective surveillance feedback
loops frequently elicit reactions from users, these are
not always interpreted as representing invasions of pri-
vacy. Depending on how well the cues calculated by
algorithmic systems mesh with users’ instantaneous
preferences, an automated message may be either
pleasing and relevant or disturbing and unsuccessful
(Ruckenstein & Granroth, 2019). Users may feel angry
when Facebook overtly monetises their personal data
(Skeggs& Yuill, 2016, p. 387) and experience ‘strange sen-
sations’ (Bucher, 2017, p. 35) when seeing evidence of
their actions’ exposure to outside surveillants—e.g., im-
mediately after loading a friend’s Facebook profile, see-
ing that friend in one’s Facebook News Feed.
While users in Ruckenstein and Granroth’s (2019)
study did not know how Facebook’s or Google’s pro-
prietary algorithms operate, they recognised the work-
ings of algorithms online. Interviewees proved well
versed in surveillance and privacy issues, mainly through
everyday understandings of algorithms as shaped by
what is taught in schools, discussion with friends, and
the media. These observations reveal that, while users
hold contradictory attitudes to surveillance and pri-
vacy, this phenomenon stems not from lack of aware-
ness/knowledge but from experiences of banality, a con-
cept referring (per Lehmuskallio, Heikkilä, & Kortesoja,
2018), to non-distinctive, ordinary, dull, and clichéd parts
of our digitally enhanced life.
While this perspective does not imply surveillance be-
ing ‘bad’ by default, it does point to banality as an in-
direct consequence of surveillance. Surveillance implies
certain structures that impose social order, structures
that cannot be willed away. That consequence is daunt-
ing, in that banality tends to undermine the very quali-
ties that the moral-coupling discourse is employed to en-
courage: moral and political reflexivity surrounding the
effects of surveillance (see Arendt, 1958).
5. Pursuing Meaningful Analysis of Privacy
Liberally oriented theory characterises privacy as a right
or an individual’s choice. As a right, privacy consti-
tutes a circle around every individual, “which no gov-
ernment…ought to be permitted to overstep…andwithin
which that person ought to reign uncontrolled either by
any other individual or by the public collectively” (Mill,
1965, p. 938). The second liberal framing defines privacy
as a claim of individuals’ stake for determining when,
how, and to what extent information about them is com-
municated to others (Westin, 1967, p. 7). Both ideas ab-
stract from issues related to political economy of capital-
ism, such as exploitation and income/wealth inequality
(Fuchs, 2011, p. 226). In so doing, they do not merely ig-
nore the fact that neither rights to privacy nor opportu-
nities to control one’s personal information are equally
distributed. As studies on the uses of data-profiling and
algorithmic analysis of underprivileged neighbourhoods
and social groups suggest, one’s resources for establish-
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ing and maintaining privacy depend on a combination of
sociological variables, such as race, income, and gender
(Eubanks, 2018; Gangadharan, 2012).
Liberal theories of privacy vary with regard to the
elasticity of the private realm articulated. In rights-based
versions, privacy is an ethical imperative so should
exist relatively independently of human actions. For
choice-based theories, privacy depends on individuals’
behaviour, which renders it variable, dynamic, and flex-
ible. In relational theories of privacy, both rights and
choices are subject to context-bound interpersonal nego-
tiation. Communication privacy management theory is a
school of research that undertakes analysis of how peo-
ple make decisions about revealing or concealing infor-
mation they consider private (Petronio & Durham, 2015,
p. 336). These scholars subscribe to microanalysis in the
style of Goffman, whereby researchers observe an open-
ended set of social negotiations over privacy norms. This
research assignment should provide a basis for aggregat-
ing people’s various expectations as to privacy. There is
an obvious methodological problem with this strategy:
Given that the number of social situations that people en-
gage in is unbounded, the selection of situations submit-
ted to empirical analysis must be likewise unbounded.
In another recommendable methodological strategy,
privacy is conceived of as a condition. With this inter-
mediate design, privacy could be approached as a clus-
ter of related but mutually independent components.
While there are numerous candidates for such a list (see
Fuchs, 2011, pp. 222–224), I would begin with three cate-
gories suggested by legal theorist RaymondWacks (2010,
pp. 41–42): solitude, anonymity, and secrecy.
Solitude, sometimes referred to in the privacy liter-
ature as seclusion or retreat, involves a time and place
wherein people can be unobserved and undisturbed by
others (Rössler, 2005, p. 144). Moments of seclusion of-
fer possibilities for stepping outside social events and
populated surroundings to be alone. Solitude constitutes
a space that other people cannot see for an individual’s
habits or routines. The value of solitude lies in its vol-
untary and temporary nature; where the condition is
imposed and cannot be lifted, it produces loneliness,
which people usually try to avoid. Unlike other dimen-
sions of privacy, solitude is anchored in spatial settings,
the spaces people tend to regard as the safest, such as
one’s home.
Anonymity, in turn, brings in the possibility of not
standing out relative to others in the population. With
anonymity, people may attend social events (public ral-
lies etc.) without being recognised/identified, and it may
encourage individuals to experiment with their identity.
This may be a source of independence, as anonymous
groups are difficult to control. There is a darker side too,
since capacity for unidentified agency may be exercised
irresponsibly (e.g., contemporary problems of uncivil be-
haviour on online discussion boards are strongly linked
to anonymity). However, anonymity can entail lack of
power, because anonymous people are not fully visible
to each other even if they may engage in the same prac-
tice or activity. A well-known example is visible in tradi-
tional media audiences (viewers and readers), who have
limited capacities to make themselves heard and influ-
encemedia production (Ang, 1991; Heikkilä, 2018, p. 70).
Finally, secrecy is a characteristic of interpersonal
communication arising among selected persons while
hidden from others. In close interpersonal relations, se-
crecy and trust are mutually constitutive elements, de-
pending upon and strengthening each other. Secrecy is
significant for politics of privacy, and classic theories of
the public sphere regard it as an essential precursor to
citizenship in that political ideas tend to spring from non-
public reflexivity. At the same time, secrecy also provides
a veil for terrorist ‘sleeper cells’ or perpetrators of domes-
tic violence.
From our discussion of Snowden’s autobiography, we
can see that secrecy is an important aspect of privacy for
him. This view resonates with the Habermasian theory
of the bourgeois public sphere, in which the emergence
of rational publics depends on opportunities for wealthy
men to reflect on current affairs in literary clubs, private
homes, and coffee houses without interference from
those in power. The same dynamics have been identified
with regard tomany other political movements, aimed at
national independence, civil rights for minorities, equal-
ity for women, and sexual self-determination (Fraser,
1989). Outside his autobiography, Snowden rarely uses
such words as ‘citizenship’ or ‘politics.’ He speaks more
generally of ‘liberty.’ About a year after his most explo-
sive revelations, he told interviewers that “reasonable
people would grant that privacy is a function of liberty.
If we get rid of privacy, we’re making ourselves less free”
(“Edward Snowden interview,” 2014).
Snowden’s view on privacy differs from that in algo-
rithmic imaginaries of ordinary Internet users, who dis-
cuss their relations to digital surveillance almost exclu-
sively from the perspective of anonymity (Bucher, 2017;
Ruckenstein & Granroth, 2019). For them, privacy en-
ables relative freedomofmovement over the digital land-
scape, whereby their behaviour might be visible to third
parties but their identities are not revealed. Thus, their
access to online services and platforms comeswith a cost
but this involves negotiation, quite different from the
bargaining related to secrecy or seclusion. At some point,
these components do intersect, though, since much of
targeted advertising relies on age-gender-location-based
sorting categories. Therefore, young women are contin-
ually told about beauty products and pregnancy tests
while young men are targets for dating-site ads and
claims of ‘hot singles near you.’
Outside the particular conditions considered, users
in these and other groups may switch role (e.g., from
citizen to consumer or vice versa) as the situation dic-
tates. Nonetheless, even the brief analysis above demon-
strates that privacy hasmultiple meanings and functions,
which need to be taken into account for meaningful de-
bate on surveillance and the politics of privacy. Because
Media and Communication, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 248–257 253
Table 1. Dimensions of privacy.
Dimension Meaning Functions Threatened by…
Solitude being unseen and unheard tranquillity, relaxation peer users, the Internet of Things
by others
Anonymity being non-distinctive among agency without accountability digital-market actors
one’s peers
Secrecy strategic interpersonal formation of opinions the security state
communications
Intimacy sharing of emotional and/or showing love and devotion accidental or deliberate ‘peeping toms’
physical proximity
Dignity absence of humiliation and self-esteem, mutual respect peer users, digital-market actors
embarrassment
Source: Adapted from Heikkilä (2018) and Wacks (2010).
these dimensions of privacy, or clusters, represent such
valuable tools for analysing what privacy would mean
as condition, it is worth looking at additional attributes
mentioned in privacy studies, outside these categories,
for further tools. To gain a fuller toolbox, I would add
to the list, alongside seclusion, anonymity, and secrecy,
at least two further categories: intimacy and dignity. All
five dimensions of the resulting framework are shown
in Table 1.
Intimacy involves communication and sharing of
emotional and/or physical proximity with others, such
as a spouse, child, or friend. Referring to a specific qual-
ity of close mutual connection and the process of build-
ing this (Jamieson, 2011), intimacy ties in with the posi-
tive human qualities of love and commitment. It also en-
ables playfulness in the form of ‘backstage language’ and
unedited conversation (Goffman, 1959, p. 128), which is
instrumental to forging the connection but could lead to
harm for the intimate partners if stripped of context and
revealed to others. A historical figure symbolising threats
to intimate privacy is Peeping Tom, whose role was at
some point adopted by tabloid journalists and paparazzi.
Recent important developments in cameras, drones, and
other devices have put the same techniques at anyone’s
disposal (Andrejevic & Burdon, 2015; Koskela, 2011).
Finally, dignity involves self-respect and reputation,
which point to conditions that, while within the inner-
most self, are taken on and maintained intersubjectively
(Honneth, 1995). Dignity is grounded in cultural norms
of behaviour or ‘good manners.’ Hence, codes of dig-
nity are contingent, not universal. The value of dignity
is revealed when it is breached—when someone feels
embarrassed or humiliated by disclosure of deeds or
thoughts that were not intended for sharing with others
(Margalit, 1996).
Only this dimension of privacy does not involve a spe-
cific mode of ‘doing’ that one would purposefully pur-
sue for privacy. Rather, dignity involves a state of mind,
which may be aggregated from other aspects of privacy
though dignity does not necessarily require all of the
other conditions to bemet. An elderly person dependent
on constant professional assistance from nurses or social
workers may feel dignified even if opportunities for soli-
tude, anonymity, secrecy, or intimacy are greatly com-
promised. Given that dignity is a state of mind, it is de-
pendent on one’s personal psychological resilience. In ad-
dition, it seems that dignity is the facet of privacy least
easily restored after undermining.
6. Conclusion
With this article, I have challenged a discursive construc-
tion that permeates much of contemporary debate on
privacy and surveillance, a discourse at whose core is
moral coupling wherein surveillance is taken as an en-
emy and privacy as a friend. While this discourse is
widespread in news media and finds support in consid-
erable recent critical surveillance literature, it proved
particularly fruitful to problematise it by considering
Snowden and his autobiography as exemplars of this line
of thought.
Although he and other critics of surveillance con-
tribute to public knowledge of digital surveillance in nu-
merous ways, they, at the same time, seem remark-
ably indifferent to the fact that Internet users in gen-
eral are not similarly outspoken critics of surveillance.
Additionally, surveillance critics demonstrate limited in-
terest in delving into conceptual analysis of privacy.
Might there be something more concrete or nuanced
than an ‘empty’word, a ‘no-go zone,’ or an abstract right?
While privacy has elicited interest within many fields
of research, the concept has also frustrated many. In
the course of listing several typologies and taxonomies
of privacy, Fuchs (2011, p. 222) notes a key problem
with privacy typologies in that they are arbitrary: “There
is no theoretical criterion used for distinguishing the
differences between the categories.” For Hong (2017,
pp. 191–192), privacy is too fragile and contradiction-rife
a concept to employ for countering the growth of surveil-
lance. These arguments are warranted but, in my view,
they should not distract us from examining what people
do in and with their privacy.
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Therefore, in this article, I have attempted to con-
ceptualise privacy as a condition of being in which five
dimensions may be distinguished for purposes of ana-
lysis. The term ‘being,’ again, has a double meaning: It
pertains to situations wherein people decide on reveal-
ing/concealing information that they consider private,
and it also denotes people’s sociologically varying situ-
ations in life. It remains for empirical studies to shed
light on how, if at all, the meaning of privacy differs
with what people do in and with privacy and uncover
any contingency on whether they are male or female,
rich or poor, residents of a mansion or a shack. This
awareness is crucial for extending studies of privacy be-
yond the abstract standard citizen found in so many text-
books and legislative documents. Moving from discus-
sions about privacy as right to work on privacy as con-
dition is a huge first step, even if the setting remains the
context of Western societies. Shifting still further would
call for evenmore profound rethinking both theoretically
and methodologically.
In this endeavour, fittingly enough, Snowden’s auto-
biography may be transformed from a theoretical prob-
lem into a methodological solution. It holds value in not
merely setting forth an authorised stakeholder’s view on
one of the most important political processes of the last
decade but also employing the life story as its format.
Thereby, readers can view the intersection of an individ-
ual’s life history with the history of society. This story is
open to multiple analytical readings, and our brief analy-
sis of Snowden’s relations to surveillance and privacy pro-
vides only a taste of the potential of the approach. The
nextmove on the pathwould be to locate life stories that
decisively differ from Snowden’s.
Life-history research, of course, has its own life, dat-
ing back to the Chicago School of Sociology in the early
20th century and still further (Plummer, 2001). This
methodology has been applied to feminist surveillance
studies (see Dubrofsky & Magnet, 2015). Since the rich
methodological insights developed within that research
tradition cannot be discussed here in detail, I refer only
to Marwick and boyd (2018), who highlight the value in
advancing research into privacy at themargins. The stark
reality is that achieving privacy is especially difficult for
those who already are otherwise marginalised. They em-
phasise: “Parents argue that they have the right to surveil
their children ‘for safety reasons.’ Activistswho challenge
repressive regimes are regularly monitored by state ac-
tors. And poor people find themselves forced to pro-
vide information in return for basic services” (Marwick
& boyd, 2018, p. 1158).
It seems that if we want to knowmore about privacy
and how surveillance reshapes privacy, there is much to
learn from people for whom privacy is a distinctly scarce
resource, those who work hardest to maintain what is
left of it.
Studies of privacy-related vulnerability would guide
us toward hearing and heeding the life stories of people
with experiences of discriminatory surveillance practices,
such as redlining and profiling of whatever sort, be it
racial, medical, or political (Eubanks, 2018; Gangadharan,
2012; Redden et al., 2020). This is not to say that only ex-
periences of the underprivileged matter but, rather, to
suggest that this form of knowledge is essential for deal-
ing with politics of privacy.
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